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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
----00000----

THORN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
INC., a Utah Corporation,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,

vs.

Case No. 15647 ·

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
Defendant and
Appellant.

----00000----

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
UTAH DEPARTMENT
OF
TRANSPORTATION
----00000----
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STATEMENT OF THE KlND OF CASE
This case arises out of a construction contract and involves the interpretation of contract specifications and whether the Respondent contractor is obligated to follow the contract as it is written or is
excused from compliance with certain provisions regarding
notice.

Finally, the case involves the question of the

amount of damages the Respondent is entitled to recover.
DlSPOSlTlON lN LOWER COURT
The Third District Court, the Honorable
Marcellus K. Snow presiding, awarded Plaintiff-Respondent
Thorn Construction Company judgment against DefendantAppellant for the sum of $24,500.00.

This trial Judge

determined that Respondent was entitled to additional compensation over and above contract unit prices for certain
changes in the contract and that Respondent was excused
from specification requirements to file notice of its intent to claim compensation or to provide details regarding
how its unit prices were affected to Appellant.

Finally,

the Court allowed Respondent to present its evidence of
alleged damages based on a "total cost" theory of damages
over objections by Appellant.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the Judgment in
favor of Respondent for $24,500.00 and in lieu thereof
a judgment for the sum of $1,791.30, which amount was conceded by Appellant as due and owing based on an analysis
of the unit cost for borrow material.
In the alternative, Appellant seeks a new trial
with instructions that Respondent is not excused from
compliance with contract provisions relative to notice
of intended claims and from the requirement to base its
claims for additional compensation upon detailed information related to changes in contract unit costs.

Further,

Appellant requests that the Court determine that Respondent cannot use the "total cost" approach as its method ,
of establishing compensation.
As a further alternative, Appellant seeks a
reduction in the judgment to correspond with the evidence
before the Court.
FACTS
The parties on March 27, 1973, entered into a
contract, a part of which was for construction of an access
road at Rockport State Park.
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Part of the contract provided for the importation of 28,100 cubic yards of borrow material.
Section 106.02 of the State of Utah Standard Specifications
for Road and Bridge Construction (1970 Edition), hereinafter "Standard Specifications," sets forth the requirements for suitability of such material.

Neither the con-

tract special provisions nor plans specify any source for
the borrow material.

The contractor determined his own

source as provided in Section 106.02 of the Standard Specifications, and the State tested it for suitability.
Prior to submitting its bid, representatives
of the Respondent visited the work site and Appellant's
employee, Virgil Mitchell, accompanied them on an inspection.

A "possible source'' (R. 8, 10) referred to as the

"Utelite Pit" was viewed.

Virgil Mitchell was not the

project engineer, and he had not been authorized by the
engineer as his agent to make representations concerning
the plans for the project.

Mitchell is not trained or ex-

perienced in testing for suitability of materials, and he
did not know of any previous use of the "Utelite Pit!"
(R. 188-189)

He simply stated that the source could Pprob-

ably be used." (R. 8, 10)

At the pre-construction confer-

ence Respondent stated it would use the PUtelite Pit" as
its borrow site.

When the source was tested in August of

1973, it was found to be unsuitable. (R. 37)

Respondent
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thereafter obtained suitable borrow material from Orland
Crandall in Peoa.

The increased distance one way to the

alternate source is 1.7 miles.

(R. 89)

No notice either

verbally or in writing was transmitted to Appellant by
Respondent regarding a claim for additional compensation
for the increased haul distance during the project. (R. 40)
Specification No. 105.17 states that notice in writing is
a pre-condition to a claim for additional compensation
prior to doing the work. (Exh. D-1)
The actual measured quantity of roadway excavation was determined to be 15,305 cubic yards after the pro-·
ject was completed.
proposed quantity.

This is more than a 25% underrun in the
Section 104.02 of the Standard Speci-

fications states that Respondent can "demand a supplemental
agreement."

That section allows for price adjustments, but

does not allow for anticipated profit. (Exh. D-1)

Appellant

requested data from Respondent regarding how its bid price
was calculated, but Respondent refused to supply said data
until trial of this matter. (R. 69, 88)

The evidence shows

that Respondent based its bid as follows:
Loading, hauling, placing
and compacting

,95

Fixed costs, overhead and
profit
TOTAL • • • • • • • • •

1. 20
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(R. 88)

During the project it was determined by Appellant that certain approaches and turns should be widened.
On September 6, 1973 or thereabout, the Respondent was directed by the project engineer to accomplish the necessary
widening.

(R. 47)

No amount was agreed upon or discussed

as payment for this extra work.

The Respondent did not

notify Appellant in writing that it would claim additional
payment before doing the work. (R. 40, SO)

Respondent al-

leged that its records showed a total cost of doing this
work in the amount of $56,985.07. (R. 63)

This amount was

calculated using actual paid labor and equipment based on
rental rates established by the Associated General Contractors
{AGC).

To this amount was added certain factors for overhead

and profit, which are percentages of the total.

Respondent

did not offer ~vidence to show how its "unit costsP were affected by the change in plan. (R. 65, 66)

Respondent deducted

payments made by Appellant at the unit price as bid leaving a
balance of $38,642.83.

Appellant's evidence shows that

$1,79i.30 would be due Respondent for the quantity underrun.
(R. 280)
The matter was tried to the Court, the Honorable
Marcellus K. snow presiding, on September 22, 1977, and judgment was entered on the 6th day of January, 1978, for the
of $24,500.00.
Appellant thereafter filed this appeal.
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POINT I
RESPONDENT IS NOT ENTITLED TO RELY ON
REPRESENTATIONS, IF ANY, BY VIRGIL
MITCHELL, OR RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED TO
CLAIM THAT THERE WERE REPRESENTATIONS
BECAUSE THE CONVERSATION WAS "MERGED"
IN THE CONTRACT.
A.

NO RIGHT TO RELY ON STATEMENTS OF VIRGIL MITCHELL.
Respondent 1 s evidence at trial showed that Grant

Thorn, Jerry Thorn, Jack Jones and Larry Davis as representa·
tives of Respondent Corporation visited the job site on the
19th of March of 1973 prior to submitting its bid.

(R. 7)

Said individuals have spent most of their adult lives in corr.
struction work, and Larry Davis is a graduate civil engineer.
(R. 9, 11, 28)

Said company has for years engaged in highwa:'

construction and has specialized in highway paving work. Sa:
company also has operated and carried on sand, gravel and rq
mix operations.

(R. 28)

At the time Respondent 1 s agents visisted the job
site, an employee of the Appellant, Virgil Mitchell, toured
the area of the job site with said individuals.

The evidenc

shows that the said Mitchell has been employed by the Appellant for twenty-four years.

During that time he has

not worked in the area of materials, testing or inspection,
and he has no training or education in materials.

(R. 188)

The evidence further showed that he knew nothing about the
adequacy of the material on the Utelite property, didn't
I

know of its being used by others or anything about that pit

r'
I
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site, except that it was available as a "possible" borrow
source.

(R. 188, 189)

(Also, see Finding of Fact No. 4)

Grant Thorn stated that Virgil Mitchell showed
them the pit as a "possible source" for borrow material.
(R. 8, 10, 12)

The Court in its Finding of Fact No. 5 has
stated the following:
Relying on the representations of
Mr. Mitchell, Thorn entered its bid in connection with the Wanship highway construction
project and calculated the bit item of borrow
on the basis of Mr. Mitchell's representations
that the material from the Utelite pit could
be used as borrow on the construction project.
The record further shows that Mitchell had not
been designated by the Appellant's engineer, Ed Watson, to
represent him or to make any representations concerning the
project or any work items, and particularly materials. (R.
189-193)

The record does not disclose that Mitchell made
any representations concerning the borrow material in the
Utelite pit as to its suitability or availability other than
as a "possible source." (R. 8, 10, 12, 189-193)
The State of Utah Standard Specifications for
Road and Bridge Construction (1970 Edition} which are incorporated as part of the contract (Exh. D-1) state the following with regard to examination of the work:
Section 102.05. Examination of flans, .
specifications, special provisions and site of work: The department will prepar7 ~ull! complete and accurate plans and specifications
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giving such directions as will enable
any competent contractor to carry them
out. The bidder is required to examine
carefully the site of the proposed work,
the proposal, Bl~ns,.specifications, supp~emental specifications, special provisions, and contract forms before submitting
a proposal. The submission of a bid shall
be considered prima facie evidence that the
bidder has made such examination and is
satisfied as to the conditions to be encountered in performing the work and as
to the requirements of the plans, specifications, supplemental specifications,
special provisions, and contract. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Section 106. 02 of said specifications (Exh. D-1)

governs the contractor's responsibility in providing rnateri· :
als.

In this contract there are no designated material

sources.

The section referred to says in part:
• • • When material deposits are
not designated in the special provisions,
the contractor shall provide sources of
acceptable material • . • •

The section further outlines that the responsibility is on
the contractor to secure and provide the source and to explore and develop it.

The State is further required to test

the material for its suitability.
The record further discloses that Virgil Mitchell
at the time of the alleged representation in March of 1973.
1

was employed as an engineer's aid and accompanied Respondent
agents and employees as an accommodation to them.

'·

(R. 187,

195-197}
1

Respondent asserts that it relied on Mitchell's
"representation" in preparing and submitting its bid, and th''
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;

Court has erroneously found this to be a fact and has
allowed Respondent to recover for damages allegedly resulting from increased haul distances in transporting
borrow material to the job site from an alternate source.
Appellant respectfully submits that Mitchell's
statements do not amount to a positive representation or
misrepresentation on the basis of the facts in evidence.
(R. 8, 10, 12, 187, 200)

Assuming a positive statement

was made which Appellant asserts is not supported in the
record, it is submitted that it was made without the
authority of the State Engineer and the State herewith
disclaims said representations or misrepresentations.
On the basis of the evidence there is nothing to show
that Mitchell had any authority to make any representations in conflict with the contract, plans, specifications,
etc.

No inquiry was made of Mitchell as to his authority.

(R. 189, 193)
The case of State v. Bates, 20 Ut.2d 75, 435
P.2d 417, has enunciated the doctrine that the State is not
bound by unauthorized statements of an employee absent a
showing that the employee was "held out as having authority.P
The court in that case said the following:
An officer can, however, bind his
government only by acts which come within
the just exercise of his ~fficial ~owers
and within the scope of his authorit~, unless the government held out the officer
as having authority to do th7 acts. An •
unauthorized act or declaration of ~n ~ff~cer
does not estop the government from insisting
on its invalidity.
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It should be understood at this point that
Mitchell was not authorized to make any representations
other than those consistent with the plans and specifications.

(Exh. D-1, Sec. 105. 09)

(Also, R. 16)

It is difficult to understand how the trial
Court concluded that Respondent is entitled to rely on
Mitchell's so-called "representations."

There were four

representatives of Respondent, including a civil engineer
who examined the materials site.

These men are experts

in the field of road building and particularly road building materials.

(R. 28)

It is inconceivable that they would '

rely in any way on representations by Mitchell when they
well knew that he was not the project engineer and when
their own expertise in materials is so evident.
At the very least the Respondent had a duty to
inquire of Mitchell as to his authority if they wanted to
rely upon statements made by him.
The obvious conclusion is that the question of
whether the material would meet the specification for borrow'·
was probably not of concern to anyone.
meet the specification for borrow.

Almost anything will.

(R. 28, 32-33)

There was

not much likelihood that Respondent was concerned about anything except the fact of the materials availability from the·
owner and what the price would be.

Since Respondent cannot'

show that they specifically inquired of Mitchell regarding
the suitability of the material or that he in fact knew about
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the materials inadequacy and failed to advise Respondent,
it was error to charge Appellant wi'th responsibility
·
for
the added costs of obtaining material from an alternate
site.

The United States Supreme Court has laid down guide-

lines in a series of cases as to when a contractor can and
cannot recover for alleged misrepresentation:

One of the

leading cases is MacArthur Brothers Co. v. U.S., 258
66 L.Ed. 433, 42 S.Ct. 255 (1922).

u.s.

The Court there said the

following:
In the case at bar the government
undertook a project and advertised for bids
for its performance but there was no knowledge of impediments to performance, no misrepresentations of the conditions, exaggeration of them nor concealment of them, nor,
indeed knowledge of them. To hold the government liable under such circumstances, would
make it insurer of the uniformity of all work
and cast upon it responsibility for all the
conditions which a contractor might encounter
and make the cost of its projects always an
unknown quantity.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Appellant respectfully submits that the same
standard applies to representations by Appellant, be they
written or verbal.

The Respondent must show in either

event that Appellant had (1) knowledge of impediments to
performance;

(2) misrepresented those conditions; (3) ex-

aggerated them; or (4) concealed conditions.

Here the

Respondent has not shown that Virgil Mitchell had: (1)
Knowledge that the Utelite Pit material was in fact unsuitable;

(2) that Mitchell in fact misrepresented condi-
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6,

tions;

(3) there is no evidence that Mitchell tried to

build up the source or said anything about the source;
(4) there is no evidence of concealment of any evidence
of conditions by Mitchell.

{How could he conceal anything

if he didn't know anything?)
Clearly the trial Judge has committed error in
concluding that Respondent can rely on ''representations by
Mitchell" and can therefore recover for the additional
cost of going to an alternate source.
Since the Court made no breakdown of damages which .
I

it awarded Respondent, there is no way to separate the amour.:'
of recovery allowed Respondent for this erroneous award, and
Appellant is therefore entitled to a new trial on this point
alone.

It is also entitled to directions to the trial Court

not to allow recovery by Respondent for any damage related«
the obtaining of borrow material from a source other than thi
Utelite Pit.
B.

ESTOPPEL BY REASON OF MERGED CONVERSATION
Appellant believes there is also a "merger" questi~

The conversation with Mitchell took place before the submiss:i
of Respondent's bid.

{R. 6-10)

All conversations are there·

fore merged under familiar principles of contract law.
Court stated the following in the case of National

ThiS:

Sure~

v. Christiansen Brothers, Inc., 29 U.2d 460, 511 P.2d 731: I
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. . • • • Where parties engage in negotia ti~ns concerning a transaction pursuant
~o ~hich they enter into a written contract,
it ~s presumed that all matters relating to
subJec~ are me:ged in and constitute a complete integration of their agreement.
Obviously, the agreement is silent as to material sites
or representations of any kind relating to them, and Respondent should therefore be estopped to assert anything
concerning alleged statements by Mitchell since the conversation took place prior to the execution of the contract.
POINT II
RESPONDENT'S FAILURE TO TIMELY NOTIFY
APPELLANT OF INTENTION TO CLAIM ADDITIONAL COMPENSATION IS A WAIVER OF RIGHT
TO RECOVER SAME UNDER THE CONTRACT,
Respondent brought suit to recover additional compensation for., among other things, (1) the increased costs
of obtaining material from a borrow source located further
away from the construction than the planned source; and (2)
increased costs of widening roadway sections already completed
or partially complete when directed to do so by the engineer.
In the first instance there was no mention of a
claim for additional compensation by Respondent during the
period of construction.

In the second case, there was appar-

ently a discussion between Dennis Weir of Respondent and the
State's engineer, Ed Watson.

Weir alleged in the discussi9n

which was held either September 6 or September 9, 1973, that
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they would need additional money, and Watson allegedly
agreed to this.

(R. 50)

No dollar amount was discussed

and nothing was said about filing a notice of a claim or
being excused from filing a claim.
In neither one of these instances was there a
written notice filed by Respondent that it intended to
claim additional compensation.
Section 105.17 of the Standard Specifications
reads in pertinent part as follows:
If, in any case where the contractor
deems that additional compensation is due
him for work or material not clearly covered
in the contract, • • • the contractor shall
notify the engineer in writing of his intention to make claim for such additional
compensation before he begins the work on
which he bases the claim.
If such notification is not given . . • then the contractor
hereby agrees to waive any claim for such
additional compensation. • • •
This fact alone should defeat Respondent's claim to any
additional compensation related to the obtaining of borrow
material.

In the absence of a waiver of said specifica-

tion, the Respondent is clearly bound to give the requisite,
notice.
Appellant asserts that the Court erred in decid·
ing that,
• • • Mr. Weir and Mr. Watson had
enjoyed a favorable working relationship
in connection with other projects with which
they had both been involved in the past. Mr.
Weir relied on the statement of Mr. Watson
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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to the e~f7ct that Thorn would be paid what7ver additional costs were incurred in chan _
ing the turning radii, although a specific g
amount was not agreed upon.

Mr. Weir was never informed by Mr. Watson that
he did not have to file a written notice. (R. 70)
Secondly, Mr. Weir knew of the specification
requirement and had in fact filed notices of this character
on other projects. (R. 72)
Since Mr. Watson did not tell Mr. Weir that
he did not have to file a written notice of claim as required by the specifications, how can the Court conclude
that Respondent had any right to rely on the statement of

Mr. Watson that Thorn "would be paid" and that this excused
Respondent from compliance with a contract provision?
Appellant submits that far from sustaining
Respondent's position, the facts of the matter indicate a
waiver by Respondent of its right to compensation by its
silence and failure to file the notice in advance or a
claim for compensation until after the project was complete.
Appellant in the absence of a notice of a claim by Respondent was entitled to assume that Respondent was satisfied
with the unit price and waived a claim for any additional
payment.
The obvious conclusion is that the Court was
wrong in concluding as it did in Conclusion of Law No. 2
that the provisions of Section 105.17 do not apply and that
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the contractor is excused from giving notice of its intent
to file a claim.
This Court in the case of Zion's Properties, Inc.
v. Holt, 538 P.2d 1319, said the following at page 1322:
• • • unless there is some showing of
legal excuse or justification for failure to
perform the obligations of a contract, it
must be enforced according to its terms.
[Citing Puggi v. Skliris, 54 U.88, 179 P.79
(1919)]
This proposition applies even more forcefully
when the State is a party.

As the U.S. Supreme Court said ,
I

in the case of Federal Crop Ins. Corporation v. Merrill, 331

·
1

U.S. 380, 68 s.ct. 1, 92 L.Ed. 10:
Whatever the form in which the
goverrunent functions, anyone entering into an
arrangement with the goverrunent takes the risk
of having accurately ascertained that he who
purports to act for the government stays within
the bounds of his authority • . • .
The record in fact shows that Appellant 1 s engineer
Watson in response to a question from Respondent 1 s counsel
about how he would characterize his relationship with Mr.
Weir prior to the conversation about payment for the extra ,
I

work of widening the curves radius said the following: (R. 11 ~'
Well, up until after, with Mr. Weir or
any other contractor representative, I try to
establish a good rapport. However, I try to
stay within the realms of the specification
bands, because we know that is part of ourwell, I just don't know how to word it, but
we have plaques on the wall that tell us what
happened (sic) if we don't.
Q (By Mr. Stewart) What do you mean by
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tbat11.

A Well, I don't really know how it is
worded, but if you get off the beat too far
you can end up in San Quentin or wherever.

This does not indicate any special relationship with
Respondent contractor which justifies their reliance on
this relationship as an excuse for failing to comply with
a contract provision.
To say that this "relationship" so-called justified Respondent ignores the explanation by the witness
Watson in answer to a question by Respondent's counsel
at page 243 of the Record as follows:
Q (By Mr. Stewart) In your experience,
and perhaps we ought to limit this, well, I
won't limit it, but in your experience over
the course of years is that there had been a
time when you have gotten together with the
contractor and agreed, without the formality
of submission of a written request or a notice
and actually agreed, to pay for extra work in
an informal way?
A I think on some minor items where the
paper work would have cost more than the work
itself, and I can't specify just what it could
be, we might have paid for an item in a few
loads of gravel or something to that effect
that would be equal to the money involved.
The facts are that Respondent under the law that pertains
and the facts of this case cannot excuse itself from the requirement of timely notice and the Court's conclusion to the
contrary is clearly error, and the judgment should be reversed.
POINT III
SECTION 104.02 OF THE STANDARD SPECIFICATIONS
LIMITS THE RECOVERY OF DAMAGES TO FIXED COSTS
AND OVERHEAD FOR BID ITEMS WHICH UNDERRUN MORE
THAN TWENTY-FIVE (25%) PERCENT.
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The bid item of borrow in the original proposal
is estimated to be 28, 100 cubic yards.

The actual quantity

measured and paid for pursuant to specifications is 15,305
cubic yards.

This results in an underrun in excess of twenty·.

five percent (25%).
Section 104.02 of the Standard Specifications

allows relief to the contractor by way of supplemental agree·.
ment in this event.

·The actual provision in pertinent part !

reads as follows:
• • • The contractor agrees to accept
the work as altered • • • provided, however,
that if demand is made in writing by either
party to the contract, a supplemental agreement will be necessary before any alteration
is made which involves any one of the following:
(3) An increase or decrease of
more than 25% in the quantity of any major contract item • •
• The adjustment in compensation
provided for under conditions (2) and l3 l
above, • • •
In the event of a decrease,
any adjustments in payment shall apply to
the quantity or quantities of work actually
performed.
In the case of decreased quantities of
work, no allowance shall be made in the supplemental agreement for anticipated profits. · · ·
It should be noted that the foregoing provision
contemplates that the supplemental agreement shall be worked
out before the change is made.

1'

In this case, the fact of the

underrun in quantity was not anticipated in advance.

It was
I

conclu''~
not until the final quantities were calculate d a t th e
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I

of the project that the underrun was discovered. (R. 93)
Past precedent within the Department of Transportation has been to compensate the contractor for his
fixed costs and overhead which he would not otherwise recover because of the quantity underrun. (R. 303)

The rea-

soning for this approach is that a contractor in determining his bid on a contract item would normally include his
estimated costs of labor, materials and equipment; to this
he would then add his fixed costs, overhead and profit.
In theory then, it is reasonable in an underrun to pay only
fixed costs and overhead.

The specification does not allow

for payment of profit, and the contractor has not incurred
labor, material and equipment costs, so all that is left is
the fixed costs and overhead.
Respondent was requested to supply data regarding how his bid was calculated. (R. 68-69 and Exh. D-12 and
D-13)
(R.

The Respondent failed to provide this information.

69)
The evidence at trial finally disclosed how the

Respondent had calculated his bid price for the borrow item.
The Respondent had estimated twenty-three cents for loading,
thirty-seven

cents for hauling, thirty-five cents for plac-

ing, and twenty-five cents for overhead, fixed costs and
profit.

(R. 88)
Notwithstanding the failure to demand a supple~

·
th e work , the Appellant admits
mental agreement before doing
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an obligation to pay the fixed costs and overhead on the
underrun quantity of 12,795 cubic yards which calculates
to something less than twenty-five cents per ton.
This Court in construing this section of the
State of Utah Standard Specifications in the case of Jack
B. Parson Construction Co. v. State of Utah, 552 P.2d 107,
chose to construe this section literally as it is written.
With this precedent, Appellant submits that Respondent's
claim for relief in the absence of a supplemental agreement
before accomplishing the work should be denied.
Appellant believes that in agreeing to compensate Respondent for ''fixed costs and overhead," the Respondent is placed in the same condition it would have been
but for the underrun.

It is further respectfully submitted

that any recovery allowed over and above fixed costs and
overhead must be supported by clear and convincing evidence
that the Respondent has actually incurred the expense and
that it is directly related to the pay item and could not
have been avoided by Respondent.
not do during trial.

This the Respondent did

The Respondent instead has taken the

position that because of the quantity underrun he is entitled to recover his entire costs as calculated by "force
account."

The fact that he did not calculate his bid by

means of "force account'' methods does not seem to trouble
him.
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The Utah Court in the old case of Wilson v.
Salt Lake City, 52 U. 506, 174 P. 847 (1918) made a very
pertinent observation concerning payment for extra work.
The Wilson case involved a claim by the contractor for
"extra work" which the City felt was not extra but "additional" and therefore covered by contract prices.

The

case also involved a question of whether procedural requirements had been followed.

The Court stated the fol-

lowing at page 513:
. • • Unjust and exorbitant demands
are so often made for extra labor by those
undertaking the work of constructing public
improvements that the text writers have frequently taken occasion to connnent concerning
the claims of contractors for extra labor
performed. We quote:
'Municipal corporations have so
frequently been defrauded by exorbitant
claims for extra work under contracts for
public improvements that it has become
usual to insert in contracts a provision
that the contractor shall not be entitled
to compensation for extra work unless it
has been ordered in a particular manner.
19 R.C.L. 1077 (sec. 362)
Experience, however, keeps a dear
but a good school, and those who have a
broader knowledge of such transactions
agree that by some mysterious process.of
calculation, things valued afterward in
that way usually cost a great deal more
than if contracted beforehand. In general,
the ordering of the extra work must be made
by the properly qualified agent of the person to be charged.
4 Elliott on Contracts,
Section 3740.'
This case, it is respectfully submitted, exactly
fits the type of situation the Wilson Court had in mind.
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Pro-

r

I
cedural requirements were not followed in the instant case
by Respondent to protect its claim.

The engineer was not

able to perform his duty vis-a-vis the claim since Respondent refused to submit information regarding how his unit
costs were affected.

Now Respondent asserts a grossly

inflated claim which makes no attempt to explain why the
placement of seventeen percent (17%) of the total yardage
can account for an overall increase in the unit price for
borrow from $1.20 per yard to $3.72 per cubic yard.

(Bid

price was $1.20, $3.72 is derived by dividing total claim
amount of $56,985.07 by yardage moved of 15,305 cubic yards.)
The Respondent has either grossly inflated his claim, or he
made a bad bid.

The Appellant has no responsibility to under·

write the "bad bid" and should not have to pay an inflated
claim.

Either way, the figure asserted by Respondent and

the amount found by the Court cannot be supported by the
evidence.
This Court was indeed right in the case of ~
Rowland Construction Co. v. City of South Salt Lake, 7 Ut.2d
273, 323 P.2d 258 (1958) when it said the following:
• • • If contractors such as plaintiffs can make a competitive bid on a project, omitting such a substantial item, then
sue and recover on quantum meruit, it is
readily seen what havoc could be wrought
with the competitive bidding.
• • • It would have to be considered
as "extra work" beyond that specified in the
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contract. In such event the contract
clearly provides that it cannot be done
and charge~ for wit?out written approval
of the engineer, which admittedly was
not done.
In the instant case the contract clearly provides a procedure to be followed if the contractor desires
to assert a claim for additional payment.

Respondent did

not follow the procedure, therefore the claim should be
denied with the single possible exception that because of
the quantity underrun in borrow which no one foresaw, the
Respondent should recover his fixed costs and overhead not
otherwise recoverable, which amounts to $1,791.30 on the
basis of Respondent's testimony.
Again, the Court's ruling gives us no basis to
determine how much, if any

of the judgment awarded by the

Court, is based on·the quantity underrun.

In fact, the Find-

ings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are silent as to whether
any consideration was given to this item by the Court.

Since

there was considerable evidence before the Court on this
question the Court may have considered it or may have rejected it.

In any event, Appellant submits that without a

determination in the Findings, Conclusions or Judgment there
is no way to rationalize the Court's judgment.

If the Court

in fact awarded in excess of the sum conceded by Appellant
($1,791.30), it is error in Appellant's opinion.

The judg-

ment simply cannot be harmonized with the evidence unless the
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Court breaks down the amount to disclose how it was arrived
at to determine what is erroneous and what, if any, is possibly supported by the evidence.
The Appellant is entitled to a new trial.
POINT IV
RESPONDENT IS NOT ENTITLED TO RECOVER
ITS TOTAL COSTS ON A "FORCE ACCOUNT"
THEORY AS THE TRIAL COURT HAS ERRONEOUSLY FOUND BECAUSE OF CHANGES ORDERED
BY THE ENGINEER.
During construction of the fill connecting the
Rockport State Park Access Road to the highway (Wanship to
Peoa) it was decided by Appellant that said fill should be
widened, and in addition certain turning radii in the park
access road were ordered widened.

These changes were re-

quested on or about September 6, 1973, and the question of
compensation was also discussed by Appellant's engineer, Ed
Watson, and Dennis Weir, representing Respondent.

(R. 47-49)

There was no agreement reached regarding the amount to be
paid Respondent for this additional work.

(R. 105)

Like-

wise, no claim as required by Section 10 5. 17 of the Standard Specifications was filed at any time while the project
was under construction.

(R. 70-72 and Finding of Fact No. Jli_

This point has already been discussed in this brief under.
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Point II, supra, and that argument is herewith incorporated by reference.
Section 104.02 of the Standard Specifications
has already been referred to herein. (See Point III)
That argument was related to the relief which is provided for in said Section when there is an underrun in
a major item in excess of twenty-five percent (25%).
The Court in its Conclusion of Law No. 4
has concluded that Respondent is entitled to recover
extra expenses incurred in widening the turning radii
and does not have to submit data as to how its unit
costs are affected, but can recover a "reasonable amount.•
The Court then found $24,500.00 to be a "reasonable amount
• for extra expenses incurred in transporting borrow
material from the Crandall Pit and in widening the turning radii of the location where the new access road meets
the existing roadway."
There is no attempt in the Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law or the Judgment to itemize the portion
assigned to: (1) increased hauling costs and other costs incidental to the alternate borrow pit over the originally
planned pit;

(2) the costs associated with the quantity un-

derrun in the bid item of borrow; and (3) the costs associated with widening the fill and turning radii of the new :
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park access road.
Appellant respectfully submits that the
trial Court appears to have used an improper approach
to determine the damages recoverable by Respondent for
widening the approach road.

At the very least it was

error to allow Respondent to submit its evidence on a
"total cost theory" which is the way Respondent submitted
its evidence.

Appellant objected to this approach at the

commencement of trial and urged the trial Court not to
allow evidence based on a "total cost" theory.
4-6)

(See R.

Under the "total cost'' theory of damages the Appel-

lant becomes an unwilling insurer in effect.

The Respon-

dent in this instance over Appellant's objections has addec
up his total labor, equipment rental, overhead, fixed costs
and profit to get a gross total cost.
P-9 and P-10)

(R. 55-64 and Exhibit

From this figure he has deducted the amount

paid under the contract unit price for the total amount of
yardage moved and asserts that this represents his damages.
The obvious problem with this approach is that it turns a
competitive bid into a guaranteed profit contract.
Section 104.02 of the Standard Specifications
and particularly subsection (4) contains the following per·
tinent language which Appellant asserts is directly applic·
able to the instant case:
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• • • Written requests for a supplemental agreement under condition (4)
[Condition 4 refers to a change in the
nature of the design or in the character
of construction which measurably increases
or decreases the unit cost of performing
any item of work.] shall set forth in detail
the particulars and character by which the
work was changed and by what amounts the
unit costs of the contract items will be
altered.
When it is determined by the
Engineer that under the provisions of this
subsection, a supplemental agreement is
justified and an agreement satisfactory to
both parties cannot be made, the Engineer
may determine an amount which he feels is
fair and equitable, and order the Contractor
to proceed accordingly, or may order the work
performed on a force account basis or cancel
the work from the contract. If the work is
performed at the adjusted price as established
by the Engineer and the Contractor considers
additional compensation is due him, he may
request further consideration as provided in
Article 105.17.
Factually, in this case the following points are
of importance:
1.

There was no request for a supplemental agree-

ment submitted by Respondent.
2.

There was a general recognition by Appellant's

engineer in the September 6 meeting of a change in the plan or
character of construction (condition 4) which qualified for
additional compensation.
3.

There was no agreement as to the amount of

additional compensation.
4.

There was no attempt at any time by Respondent

to "set forth in detail the particulars and character by which
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the work was changed and by what amounts the unit costs
were altered."
5.

The engineer did not "determine an amount

which he felt was fair and equitable," nor did he "order
the work performed on a force account basis."
6.

Testimony of Dennis Weir was that about

2,500 yards of 17% or the total yardage in the fill was invalved in widening of the fill.

(R. 87)

As to the "total cost theory" of damages, the
best reasoned cases have rejected this approach or at the
very least have allowed evidence of that nature as preliminary only.
In a recent case in California, entitled Huber,
Hunt

&

Nichols, Inc. v. Moore, 136 Cal. Rptr. 603 (1977), the

California Court of Appeal delivered a lengthy opinion involving a suit by a contractor for damages arising out of
the construction of the Fresno Civic Center.

In this case

the contractor-plaintiff attempted to submit a three-inch
thick computer printout of items identified by cost coding
as his evidence of damages.

The Court refused to allow thi'

as too confusing for the jury.

The Court observed at page

619 the following:

• . • Contractor's entire attitude
in the court below and in this court is that
it is entitled to be compensated for all losses
sustained over its original estimate. • • • .
Stated in its simplest form contracto7' ~ po~i-,
tion is that since the plans and specification-
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cont~ined errors and omissions and the
architects were negligent in supervising
the work and there were delays in completing the project and contractor sustained
a loss, contractor should be made whole
by architects . • • •

The Court further discussed the attempt by the contractor
to prove damages under a total costs approach, including
the attempt to justify this approach since that is the
way its records are kept and it is "standard business
practice."

The Court then stated the following at page

622:
• • • If the computer printout was
not organized in a manner to indicate the
specific cause of particular cost overruns,
a qualified accountant should have been able
to make the calculations from the original
records which were the source for the data
fed into the computer. But nobody took the
time and effort to make such calculations.
No explanation is given for the failure.
If we were to accept contractor's
contention as to the law of this state, the
result would for all practical purposes,~
nullify all laws regarding competitive bidding on public contracts. Under such a concept, contractors could submit any bid necessary to obtain the job knowing that the public agency would be required to pay whatever
costs contractor incurred on the project if
contractor could discover some error or omission however irrelevant in the plans and
specifications • • • • (Emphasis supplied.)
Appellant submits that the same reasoning applies in the
instant case.

For instance, why should Respondent recover

any additional costs for the yardage delivered to the fill
before it was widened?

Why should Respondent be allowed to
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recover anything additional without calculating exactly
how much additional costs are involved with the 2,500
yards hauled in to widen the existing fill?

Stated in

terms of the specification, why shouldn't respondent be
required to "set forth in detail the particulars and
amounts the unit costs of the contract items

will be

altered?"
One of the leading cases cited by the California
Court in Huber, supra, is the case of Boyaj ian v. U. s., 423 ·
F.2d 1231 (1970).

This is a case decided by the U.S. Court

of Claims and involves contract claims based on a ''total cos'.
theory.

The total claimed contract costs were $694,735.00

and total receipts under the contract were $486,210.00 fora
difference of $208, 525. 00 which plaintiff sought to recover.
The Court in commenting on defendant's defense based on
plaintiff's failure to prove damages, stated as follows:
The so-called "total cost" method
upon which plaintiff relies is here unacceptable. Accordingly, there is no need
to make any determination on the merits of
these three causes, for even assuming they
are valid and that defendant's conduct
amounted to the claimed breaches, plaintiff's failure to make any satisfactory
showing of the amount of damages flowing
from such breaches would require the dismissal of such causes anyway.
The Court further observed as follows:
• . . Recovery of damages for a breach
of contract is not allowed unless acceptable
evidence demonstrates that the damages claimed
resulted from and were caused by the breach.
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dant's part." River Construction corp.
v. U.S., 159 Ct.Cl. 254, 270 (1962) As the
court held in J.D. Hedin Construction co.
v. U.S., 347 F.2d 235, 259, 171 Ct.Cl. 70
108 (1965):
I
As in all breaches of contract
cases, the proper measure of damages for
defendant's breaches is the amount of
plaintiff's extra costs directly attributable to said breaches. [Citing Sadler
v. U.S., 287 F.2d 411 (1961))

However, contrary to these basic
causal connection damage principles, no
attempt is here made to relate any specific
amount of increased costs to any particular
alleged breach. Nor is any satisfactory
explanation given as to why such an attempt
was not made or why it would not have produced
reasonably accurate results. Instead, the damage proof consists only of an accountant's
schedule (and the accountant's testimony in
support thereof), setting forth computations,
based on plaintiff's books and records, of
plaintiff's total expenditures in performing
and subtracting therefrom the total contract
receipts, thus arriving at a total "loss"
figure, for which plaintiff demands recouprnent.

As was pointed out in J.D. Hedin Const.
Co. v. U.S., supra, the ascertainment of increased costs directly attributable to delay
resulting from a breach of contract by defendant is normally measurable with a reasonable
degree of accuracy.

It is settled, however, that a contractor
is not entitled to recover "expenses" which would
properly have been incurred regardless of the .
[breach]. Sadler v. u.s., 287 F.2d 41, 415, 152
Ct.Cl. 557, 564 (1961)
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Other cases from the Court of Claims that
have reached this same basic conclusion regarding the
"total cost" approach are as follows:

Christensen Con-

struction Corp. v. U.S., 325 F.2d 458, 163 Ct.Cl. 351;
Lilley Ames Co., Inc., v. U.S., 293 F.2d 632, 154 Ct.Cl.
549; Turnbull Inc., et al., v. U.S., 389 F.2d 1015, 180
Ct.Cl. 1025.
As to the adequacy of the proof submitted by
Respondent, the Court of Claims in rejecting this submission of proof by an accountant's schedule said the following in the case of River Construction Corp. v. U.S., 159
Ct.Cl. 270:
Recoverable damages cannot be
proved by a naked claim for a return of
costs even when they are verified. The
costs must be tied in to fault on defendant's part.
The Court of Claims in the case of F.H.McGraw

& Co. v. U.S., 130 F. Supp. 394, 131 Ct.Cl. 501 (1955)

ma~

this very pertinent observation:
• • • The court, after stating that
"[T]his [total cost] method of proving damage
is by no means satisfactory, because among
other things, it assumes plaintiff's costs
were reasonable and that plaintiff was not
responsible for any increases in cost, and
because it assumes plaintiff's bid was accurately computed which is not always the
case, by any means," "flatly stated • • •
approval was not given to proof of damages
for breach of contract by showing the difference in plaintiff's bid and his costs on
the entire job."
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Finally, the Court in Boyajian v.
at P· 1244,

ruled

u.s.,

supra,

that where the record did not contain

"reasonably satisfactory evidence" separate from that presented as in the instant case by an accountant's schedule,
as follows:
.
.
• • • T~e court has been obliged to
dismiss the claim for failure of damage proof,
regardless of the merits, citing Robertsv. u.s.,
357 F.2d 943; Snyder-Lynch Motors, Inc. v. U.S.,
297 F.2d 910, and River Const. Corp. v. u.s,
supra, among others.
Appellant submits that the most the Respondent
is entitled to under the best reasoned cases is the opportunity
to submit its evidence of damages sustained by reason of its
being required to widen the approaches and turning radii.

Fur-

ther i t is submitted that Respondent had the burden of showing
how its unit costs were affected by the change.

Since the

change only applied to 2,500 cubic yards, there is no reason
to alter the unit price for the other yardage already placed
when the change was ordered.

If Respondent is entitled to

recovery under force account payment, then it is again respectfully submitted that only the work accomplished subsequent to
September 6, 1973 can qualify for consideration, and indeed
only if this court finds that Respondent's failure to file a
claim prior to doing the work is not procedurally fatal to the
claim.
The Respondent indeed has cavalierly admitted that
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tract i tern of borrow to Appellant al though it was requested
to do so at least twice.

(R. 68, 69)

Since the Respondent failed to submit evidence
under either approach there is no competent evidence before
the Court for the Court to consider in assessing damages.
The trial Court is obviously in error and had to resort to
speculation to determine the amount it awarded Respondent as
damages.

The judgment should therefore be reversed.
CONCLUSION
There is no way the judgment of the Court can

be sustained based on the Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law. ·It is also evident from an examination of the recor:
that the facts will not support a judgment against Appellant
in excess of the sum of $1,791.30 conceded by Appellant if
the law is properly applied.
The Court found that Respondent was entitled to
rely on the representations of Virgil Mitchell concerning
the borrow site.

However, it is clear from the record that

the representation was a simple statement that i t was avail·
able as a "possible" source.

The facts further demonstrate

that Mitchell knew nothing about materials, was not instruct
or authorized by Appellant's engineer Watson to say anythin~
about the borrow site, and further, that he did not know of
any use of the area by any other contractor, or whether 1"t
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was suitable.

On the other hand, the facts show that

Respondent's personnel are trained professionals in
materials and were charged by specification requirement
to make their own investigation, and the submission of
a bid is prima facie evidence of their satisfaction as
to conditions to be encountered.

It is obvious error

for the Court to permit Respondent to rely on the socalled "representation" of Virgil Mitchell.
The Court further found that Respondent was
excused from specification requirements to give timely
notice of its intent to file a claim for additional compensation or to submit certain essential information showing how its unit costs were affected by the alleged changes
in plans or character of work.

Again, the facts do not

justify these findings and conclusions by the Court.

There

is no evidence that the State's engineer Watson had any
special relationship with this Respondent contractor or
that he customarily ignored specifications, or that he excused Respondent from complying with specifications.

Further,

there is evidence to show that Respondent knew of the notice
requirement and had in fact complied with that requirement
on other jobs.

The law is clear both generally and specifi-

cally in this State that particular adherence is required to
contractual provisions particularly where a public agency is
involved.

In other words, the court's findings and conclusions
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in regard to contractual provisions are not supportable
either factually or legally.
The Court further committed error in permitting
the Respondent to submit evidence of its damages by using
a "force account" method which is the same as a "total cost"
theory of damages, which theory has been rejected by the
most prestigious Courts such as the United States Court of
Claims and the State of California.

A further analysis of

the evidence before the Court which relates to damages shows
that the "change in plan," if indeed it amounts to that under
the specification, only affected seventeen percent (17%) of
the total borrow amount.

The Court on the other hand per-

mitted evidence to come in as if the entire bid item of bar·
row was affected.

This, it is submitted, violates the speci·

fication, ignores the facts, and permits Respondent to completely circumvent its bid and reap a windfall.
Finally, since the Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law and Judgment are all silent as to how the judgment
amount was determined by the court, it is impossible to ascertain what the Court considered in arriving at the judgmen:
amount.

At the very least Appellant is ent;i.tled to know wha:'

the Court awarded for the elements of damage claimed by Respondent, including those associated with the alternate bor·
row site and the so-called "change in plans" or "character.cl
construction."
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It is respectfully submitted that this Court
should reduce the judgment to the amount conceded of
$1,791.30, or in the alternative, reverse the judgment and
remand it for a new trial with instructions to eliminate
any consideration for the alternate borrow site and to
require Respondent to show, if it can, exactly how and in
what manner its unit costs were affected only upon 17% of
the borrow item and to allow recovery only upon a showing
of actual damage, without being permitted to use a "total
cost" approach to damages.

Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN, Attorney General

.~~~
ELAN

D. FORD
Attorney General
Attorney for Appellant
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This is to certify that two copies of the foregoing Appellant's Brief were mailed, postage prepaid, to
Steven H. Stewart, Attorney for Respondent, 220 South Second
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day of May, 1978.
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